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Statistical mechanics approach to a reinforcement learning model with memory
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We introduce a two-player model of reinforcement learning with memory. Past actions of an
iterated game are stored in a memory and used to determine player’s next action. To examine
the behaviour of the model some approximate methods are used and confronted against numerical
simulations and exact master equation. When the length of memory of players increases to infinity
the model undergoes an absorbing-state phase transition. Performance of examined strategies is
checked in the prisoner’ dilemma game. It turns out that it is advantageous to have a large memory
in symmetric games, but it is better to have a short memory in asymmetric ones.
I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory plays an increasingly important role in
many disciplines such as sociology, economy, computer
sciences or even philosophy [1]. Providing a firm math-
ematical basis, this theory stimulates development of
quantitative methods to study general aspects of con-
flicts, social dilemmas, or cooperation. At the simplest
level such situations can be described in terms of a two-
person game with two choices. In the celebrated example
of such a game, the Prisoner’s Dilemma, these choices
are called cooperate (C) and defect (D). The single Nash
equilibrium, where both players defect, is not Pareto op-
timal and in the iterated version of this game players
might have some incentives to cooperate. However, find-
ing an efficient strategy even for such a simple game is
highly nontrivial albeit exciting task, as evidenced by
the popularity of Axelrod’s tournaments [2]. These tour-
naments had the unquestionable winner - the strategy
tit-for-tat. Playing in a given round what an opponent
played in the previous round, the strategy tit-for-tat is
a surprising match of effectiveness as well as simplicity.
Later on various strategies were examined: determinis-
tic, stochastic, or evolving in a way that mimic biological
evolution. It was also shown that some strategies perform
better than the strategy tit-for-tat, as an example one can
mention the strategy called win-stay loose-shift [3]. In an
interesting class of some other strategies previous actions
are stored in the memory and used to determine future
actions. However, since the number of possible previ-
ous actions increases exponentially fast with the length
of memory and a strategy has to encode the response for
each of such possibilities, the length of memory has to
be very short [4]. Such a short memory cannot detect
possible longer-term patterns or trends in the actions of
the opponent.
Actually, the problem of devising an efficient strategy
that would use the past experience to choose or avoid
some actions is of much wider applicability, and is known
as reinforcement learning. Intensive research in this field
resulted in a number of models [5], but mathematical
foundations and analytical insight into their behaviour
seems to be less developed. Much of the theory of the
reinforcement learning is based on the Markov Decision
Processes where it is assumed that the player environ-
ment is stationary [6]. Extension of this essentially single-
player problem to the case of two or more players is more
difficult but some attempts have been already made [7].
Urn models [8] and various buyers-sellers models [9] were
also examined in the context od reinforcement learning.
In most of the reinforcement learning models [10, 11]
past experience is memorized only as an accumulated
payoff. Although this is an important ingredient, stor-
ing the entire sequence of past actions can potentially be
more useful in devising efficient strategies. To get a pre-
liminary insight into such an approach, in the present
paper we introduce a model of an iterated game be-
tween two players. A player stores in its memory the
past actions of an opponent and uses this information to
determine probability of its next action. We formulate
approximate methods to describe the behaviour of our
model and confront them against numerical simulations
and exact master equation. Let us notice that numerical
simulations are the main and often the only tool in the
study of reinforcement learning models. The possibility
to use analytical and sometimes even exact approaches
such as those used in the present paper seems to be a rare
exception. Our calculations show that when the length
of memory increases to infinity, a transition between dif-
ferent regimes of our model takes place, that is analogous
to an absorbing-state phase transition [12]. Similar phase
transitions might exist in spatially extended, multi-agent
systems [13], however in the introduced two-player model
this transition has a much different nature, namely it
takes place only in the space of memory configurations.
II. A REINFORCEMENT LEARNING MODEL
WITH MEMORY
In our model we consider a pair of players playing
repeatedly a game like e.g., the prisoner’s dilemma. A
player i (i = 1, 2) is equipped with a memory of length
li, where it sequentially stores the last li decisions made
by its opponent. For simplicity let us consider a game
with two decisions that we denote as C and D. An exam-
ple that illustrates a memory change in a single round of
a game is shown in Fig. 1 (we will mostly examine the
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FIG. 1: Memory change during a single round of a game with
two players with memories of length l = 5.The first player
shifts all memory cells to the right (removing the rightmost
element) and puts the last decision (D) of the second player
at the left end. Analogous change takes place in the memory
of the second player
symmetrical case where l1 = l2, and the index i denoting
the player will be thus dropped).
A player uses the information in its memory to evaluate
the opponent’s behaviour and to calculate probabilities
of making its own decisions. Having in mind a possible
application to the prisoner’s dilemma we make the ea-
gerness to cooperate of a player to be dependent on the
frequency of cooperation of its opponent. More specifi-
cally, we assume that the probability pt for a player to
play C at the time t is given by
pt = 1− ae
−bnt/l, (1)
where nt is the number of C’s in player’s memory at time
t while a > 0, b > 0 are some additional parameters. In
principle a can take any value such that 0 < a ≤ 1 but
numerical calculations presented below were made only
for a = 1 that left us with only two control parame-
ters, namely b and l, that determine the behaviour of the
model. For a = 1 the model has an interesting absorbing
state: provided that both players have nt = 0 they both
have pt = 0 and thus they will be forever trapped in this
(noncooperative) state. As we will see, this feature in the
limit l →∞ leads to a kind of phase transition (already
in the case of two players).
The content of the memory in principle might pro-
vide much more valuable information on the opponent
behaviour than Eq. (1) which is only one of the sim-
plest possibilities. As we already mentioned, our choice
of the cooperation probability(1) was motivated by the
Prisoner’s Dilemma but of course for other games differ-
ent expressions might be more suitable. Moreover, more
sophisticated expressions, for example based on some
trends in the distribution of C’s, might lead to more ef-
ficient strategies but such a possibility is not explored in
the present paper.
Let us also notice, that in our approach the memory
of a player stores the sequence of past actions of length l
(and that information is used to calculate the probability
of cooperation). We do not store the response to each
possible past sequence of actions (as e.g., in [4]) and that
is why memory requirements in our model increase only
linearly with l and not exponentially.
A. Mean-value approximation
Despite a simple formulation the analysis of the model
is not entirely straightforward. This is mainly because
the probability pt is actually a random variable that
depends on the dynamically determined content of a
player’s memory. However, some simple arguments can
be used to determine the evolution of pt at least for large
l. Indeed, in such a case one might expect that fluctu-
ations of nt/l are negligible and it might be replaced in
Eq. (1) with its mean value. Since at time t the coeffi-
cient nt of player (1) equals to the number of C’s made
by its opponent (2) during l previous steps we obtain the
following expression for its mean value
〈n
(1)
t 〉 =
l∑
k=1
p
(2)
t−k, (2)
where the upper indices denote the players. Under such
an assumption we obtain that the evolution of probabil-
ities p
(1,2)
t is given by the following equations
p
(1,2)
t = 1−exp
(
−b
l
l∑
k=1
p
(2,1)
t−k
)
t = l+1, l+2, . . . . (3)
In Eq. (3) we assume that both players are characterized
by the same values of b and l, but generalization to the
case where these parameters are different is straightfor-
ward. To iterate Eq. (3) we have to specify 2l initial
values. For the symmetric choice
p
(1)
t = p
(2)
t , t = 1, 2 . . . , l, (4)
we obtain symmetric solutions (i.e., with Eq (4) being
satisfied for any t). In such a case the upper indices in
Eq. (3) can be dropped.
For large l the mean-value approximation (3) is quite
accurate. Indeed, numerical calculations show that al-
ready for l = 40 this approximation is in very good agree-
ment with Monte Carlo simulations (Fig. 2). However,
for smaller l a clear discrepancy can be seen.
Provided that in the limit t → ∞ the system reaches
a steady state (pt = p), in the symmetric case we obtain
p = 1− exp(−bp). (5)
Elementary analysis show that for b ≤ 1 the only solution
of (5) is p = 0 and for b > 1 there is also an additional
positive solution. Such a behaviour typically describes
a phase transition at the mean-field level, but further
discussion of this point will be presented at the end of
this section.
B. Independent-decisions approximation
As we already mentioned, the mean-value approxima-
tion (3) neglects fluctuations of nt around its mean value.
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FIG. 2: The cooperation probability p as a function of time
t. The dashed lines correspond to the mean-value approx-
imation (3) while the continuous line shows the solution of
independent-decisions approximations (7). Simulation data
(✷) are averages over 104 independent runs. For l = 24 sim-
ulations and independent-decisions approximation (7) are in
a very good agreement while mean-value approximation (3)
slightly differs. For l = 40 calculations using (7) are not
feasible but for such a large l a satisfactory description is ob-
tained using the mean-value approximation (3). Calculations
for l = 6 shows that independent-decisions approximation
deviates from simulations. Results of approx. (3) are not pre-
sented but in this case they differ even more from simulation
data. The decrease of p as seen in the simulation data is due
to the the small probability of entering an absorbing state (no
cooperation). On the other hand, approximations (3) as well
as (7) predict that for t → ∞ the probability p tends to a
positive value. For l = 24 and 40 as initial conditions we took
(symmetric case) pt = 0.7, t = 1, 2, . . . , l and for l = 6 we
used pt = 0.5. Initial conditions in Monte Carlo simulations
corresponded to these values.
In this subsection we try to take them into account. Let
us notice that a player with memory length l can be in
one of the 2l configurations (conf). Provided that we
can calculate probability pconf of being in such a config-
uration (at time t), we can write
pt =
∑
conf
[
1− exp
(
−
bn(conf)
l
)]
pconf , (6)
where n(conf) is the number of C’s in a given configu-
ration conf and the summation is over all 2l configura-
tions; indices of players are temporarily omitted. But for
a given configuration we know its sequence of C’s and D’s
and thus its history. For example, if at time t a memory
of a player (with l = 3) contains CDD it means that at
time t − 1 its opponent played C and at time t − 2 and
t−3 played D (we use the convention that most recent el-
ements are on the left side). Assuming that such actions
are independent, in the above example the probability
of the occurrence of this sequence might be written as
pt(1 − pt−1)(1 − pt−2). Writing pconf in such a product
form for arbitrary l, Eq. (6) can be written as
pt =
∑
{Ek}
[
1− exp
(
−
bn({Ek})
l
)] l∏
k=1
ft−k(Ek), (7)
where the summation in Eq. (7) is over all 2l config-
urations (sequences) {Ek} where Ek = C or D and
k = 1, . . . , l. Moreover, n({Ek}) equals the number of
C’s in a given sequence and
ft−k(Ek) =
{
pt−k for Ek = C
1− pt−k for Ek = D
(8)
For l = 2, Eq. (7) can be written as
p
(1,2)
t = p
(2,1)
t−1 p
(2,1)
t−2 r2 + p
(2,1)
t−1 (1− p
(2,1)
t−2 )r1 +
+(1− p
(2,1)
t−1 )p
(2,1)
t−2 r1 +
+(1− p
(2,1)
t−1 )(1− p
(2,1)
t−2 )r0, (9)
where rk = 1− exp (−bk/2).
The number of terms in the sum of Eq. (7) increases
exponentially with l, but numerically one can handle cal-
culations up to l = 24 ∼ 28. Solution of Eq. (7) is in much
better agreement with simulations than the mean-value
approximation(3). For example for l = 24 and b = 2
it essentially overlaps with simulations, while (3) clearly
differs (Fig.2).
Despite an excellent agreement seen in this case, the
scheme (7) is not exact. As we already mentioned, this
is because the product form of the probability pconf is
based on the assumption that decisions at time t− 1, t−
2, . . . , t − l are independent, while in fact they are not.
For smaller values of l the (increasing in time) difference
with simulation data might be quite large (Fig.2).
C. Master equation
In this subsection we present the exact master equation
of this system. This equation directly follows from the
stochastic rules of the model and describes the evolution
of probabilities of the system being in a given state. Let
us notice that a state of the system is given by specifying
the memory content of both agents. In the following we
present the explicit form of this equation only in the case
l = 2, but an extension to larger l is straightforward but
tedious. We denote the occupation probability of being
at time t in the state where the first player has in its
memory the values E, F and the second one has G and
H as pEF,GHt . Assuming that the parameters b and l
are the same for both players and that symmetric initial
conditions are used
pEF,GHt = p
GH,EF
t , t = 0 (10)
enables us to reduce the number of equations from 16 to
10. The resulting equations preserve the symmetry (10)
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FIG. 3: The cooperation probability as a function of time
t for two players with l = 2. Exact master equation solu-
tion (11)-(12) (solid line) is in perfect agreement with simu-
lations (✷) and deviates from the independent-decisions ap-
proximation (9) (dotted line).
for any t and are the same for each of the players. The
master equation of our model for t = 1, 2, . . . takes the
following form
pCC,CCt = p
CC,CC
t−1 r
2
2 + 2p
CC,CD
t−1 r2r1 +
+ pCD,CDt−1 r
2
1
pCC,CDt = p
CC,CC
t−1 r2r1 + p
CD,DC
t−1 r
2
1
pCC,DCt = p
CC,CC
t−1 r2(1 − r2) + p
CD,CD
t−1 r1(1− r1) +
+pCC,CDt−1 (r1 + r2 − 2r1r2)
pCC,DDt = p
CC,DC
t−1 r1(1− r2) + p
CD,DC
t−1 r1(1− r1)
pCD,DCt = p
CC,DC
t−1 r2(1− r1) + p
CC,DD
t−1 r2 +
+ pCD,DCt−1 r1(1− r1) + p
CD,DD
t−1 r1
pDC,DCt = p
CC,CC
t−1 (1− r2)
2 + pCC,CDt−1 (1 − r2)(1 − r1) +
+ pCC,CDt−1 (1− r2)(1− r1) + p
CD,CD
t−1 (1− r1)
2
pCD,CDt = p
DC,DC
t−1 r
2
1
pDC,DDt = p
CD,DD
t−1 (1 − r1) + p
CC,DD
t−1 (1− r2) +
+ pCD,DCt−1 (1 − r1)
2 + pCC,DCt−1 (1− r1)(1 − r2)
pCD,DDt = p
DC,DD
t−1 r1 + p
DC,DC
t−1 r1(1− r1)
pDD,DDt = p
DD,DD
t−1 + 2p
DC,DD
t−1 (1− r1) +
+ pDC,DCt−1 (1 − r1)
2. (11)
Iterating Eq. (11) one can calculate all occupation prob-
abilities pEF,GHt . The result can be used to obtain the
probability of cooperating at time t
pt = p
CC,CC
t+1 + p
CC,DC
t+1 + 2p
CC,CD
t+1 + p
CC,DD
t+1 +
+pCD,CDt+1 + p
CD,DC
t+1 + p
CD,DD
t+1 . (12)
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FIG. 4: The steady-state cooperation probability p as a func-
tion of b. The independent-decision approximation (7) for
increasing l converges to the mean-value approximation (5)
that in the limit l = ∞ presumably becomes exact. In the
asymmetric case the cooperation probability of each player is
different. The first player (pl-1) has the memory length l1 = 1
and the second player (pl-2) has l2 = 10
3 or 3 · 103.
For b = 2 and 4 the numerical results are presented in
Fig. 3. One can see that they are in perfect agreement
with simulations. Let us notice that for b = 2 after
a small initial increase, the cooperation probability pt
decreases in time. This is an expected feature and is
caused by the existence of the absorbing state DD,DD.
Of course, the equations (11) reflect this fact: the proba-
bility pDD,DDt−1 enters only the last equation, namely that
describing the evolution of pDD,DDt (in other words, none
of the states can be reached from this state). Although
on a larger time scale pt would decrease also for b = 4, on
the examined time scale it seems to saturate at a positive
value. Solutions (i.e., pt) obtained from the independent-
decisions approximation as well as mean-value approx-
imation saturates at some positive values in the limit
t→∞ and thus approximately correspond to such quasi-
stationary states.
The (quasi-)stationary behaviour of the model is pre-
sented in Fig. 4. Provided that b is large enough the
players remain in the cooperative phase; otherwise they
enter the absorbing (noncooperative) state. However, for
finite memory length l the cooperative state is only a
transient state, and after a sufficiently large time an ab-
sorbing state will be reached. Thus, strictly speaking, a
phase transition between cooperative and noncooperative
regimes takes place only in the limit l →∞. In this limit
the mean-value approximation (5) correctly describes the
behaviour of the model. Simulations agree with (5), but
to obtain good agreement for b close to the transition
point value b = 1, the length of memory l should be
large.
We have also examined the nonsymmetric (with re-
spect to the memory length) case, where the first player
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FIG. 5: The payoff matrix of the prisoner’s dilemma game
used in the calculations presented in Figs. 6-7. The first and
the second number of a pair in a given cell denotes payoff of
the first and second player, respectively.
has the memory of finite length l1 and the length of the
memory of the second player l2 diverges. Simulations for
l1 = 1 and l2 = 10
3 and 3·103 show that in this case there
is also a phase transition (Fig. 4) but at a larger value
of b than in the symmetric case (apparently, fluctuations
due to the short memory of the first player ease the ap-
proach of an absorbing state). Results for larger values
of l1 (not presented) show that this transition approaches
the phase transition in the symmetric case.
The phase transition that is shown in Fig. 4 is an exam-
ple of an absorbing-state phase transition with coopera-
tive and noncooperative phases corresponding to active
and absorbing phases, respectively [12]. Such transitions
appear also for some models of Prisoner’s Dilemma (or
other games) in spatially extended systems [13], i.e., the
phase transition appears in the limit when the number
of players increases to infinity. In the present model the
nature of this transition is much different: the number of
players remains finite (and equal to two) but the length
of memory diverges.
III. PRISONER’S DILEMMA
In this section we examine our players in an explicit ex-
ample of the Prisoner’s Dilemma with the typically used
payoff matrix that is shown in Fig. 5. Results of the cal-
culations of the time dependence of the average payoff
are presented in Figs. 6-7. Simulations in the symmetric
case (Fig. 6) show that the larger the memory length l,
the larger the payoff. In the asymmetric case (Fig . 7)
the shorter-memory player for large t has larger payoff,
but initially it might have the smaller payoff than the
longer-memory player. In simulations shown in Figs. 6-
7 the memory length was rather short and the model
relatively quickly enters the absorbing (noncooperative)
state. That is why the average payoff converges asymp-
totically to unity. Although this is not shown, such a
behaviour was seen also in the asymmetric case, but on
a larger time scale than that presented in Fig. 7.
Using solely the results shown in Figs. 6-7 it is difficult
to predict what are the parameters (l, b) of the best (i.e.,
accumulating the largest payoff) player. This is because
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FIG. 6: The time evolution of the average payoff in the sym-
metric case (l1 = l2 = l) for b = 1.5 and several values of l.
Results are averages over 105 independent runs. As an initial
state each player at each cell of its memories has C or D with
probabilities 0.3 and 0.7, respectively.
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FIG. 7: The time evolution of the average payoff in the asym-
metric case l1 = 5 and l2 = 10. Results are averages over
105 independent runs. As an initial state each player at each
cell of its memories has C or D with probabilities 0.3 and 0.7,
respectively.
the performance of a given player depends on the pa-
rameters of the opponent, number of rounds or even the
initial content of the memory. And already the length of
memory alone results in conflicting properties: it pays off
to have a large memory in symmetric games (Fig. 6), but
it is better to have a short memory in asymmetric ones
(Fig. 7). It would be thus interesting to perform Axel-
rod’s type tournament that would make the evolutionary
selection of the winner, where the accumulated payoff
of each player would determine its fitness. Particularly
interesting might be to examine a spatially extended ver-
sion of such a tournament, where opponents of a given
player would be only its neighbouring sites. In such a
6tournament one can check for example whether spatial
effects modify the nature (i.e., universality class) of the
absorbing-state phase transition. And of course, it would
be interesting to check whether in such an ensemble of
players the strategy tit-for-tat, that in our model is ob-
tained for l = 1 and b→∞, will be again invincible.
As a further extension one can consider playing multi-
decision games. In such a case an additional group struc-
ture might appear and examination of the nature of co-
operation becomes much more subtle [14].
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In the present paper we have introduced a reinforce-
ment learning model with memory and have analysed it
using approximate methods, numerical simulations and
exact master equation. In the limit when the length of
memory becomes infinite the model has an absorbing-
state phase transition. The objective of the paper was to
develop general approaches (such as approximate descrip-
tions or master-equation analysis) to study such models,
and that is why rather a simple and motivated by the
Prisoner Dilemma form (1) of the cooperation probabil-
ity, was used. In some particular games more compli-
cated functions might prove more efficient. One can also
consider storing in player’s memory some additional in-
formation concerning, e.g., players own moves. Perhaps
analytical approaches, that we used in some simple exam-
ples, can be adapted to such more complicated problems
as well.
We also suggested that it would be desirable to perform
Axelrod’s type tournament for players with memory (as
in our work), but in addition equipped with some evo-
lutionary abilities [15]. Such a tournament would allow
us to examine the coexistence of learning and evolution
that is an interesting subject on its own. Better learn-
ing abilities might influence the survival and thus direct
the evolution via the so-called Baldwin effect [16]. Some
connections between learning and evolution were already
examined also in the game-theory setup [17, 18]. For the
present model a detailed insight at least into learning
processes is available and coupling them with evolution-
ary processes might lead to some interesting results in
this field.
Finally, let us notice that decision making based on
the content of memory seems to be connected with the
psychophysical relation between response and stimulus.
Early attempts to express such a relation in mathemat-
ical terms lead to the so-called Weber-Fechner law [19].
Despite some works that reproduce this type of law [20],
further research, perhaps using models similar to those
described in the present paper, would be desirable.
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